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Abstract
This paper deals with a new class of multi-choice games, the class of multi-
choice total clan games. The structure of the core of a multi-choice clan game
is explicitly described. Furthermore, characterizations of multi-choice total clan
games are given and bi-monotonic allocation schemes related to players￿levels are
introduced for such games. It turns out that some elements in the core of a multi-
choice total clan game are extendable to such bi-monotonic allocation schemes
via suitable compensation-sharing rules on the domain of multi-choice (total) clan
games.
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1 Introduction
In the traditional cooperative game theory, two classes of totally balanced games have
received special attention: the class of convex games (cf. Shapley (1971)) and the class
of total clan games (cf. Potters et al. (1989), Muto et al. (1988) and Voorneveld, Tijs
and Grahn (2002)). Recall that a traditional cooperative game is a pair < N;v >, where
N = f1;:::;ng is a non-empty ￿nite set of players and v is a characteristic function
v : 2N ! R, with v(;) = 0, where for each group S of players, called coalition, v(S)
is the worth guaranteed for that coalition. Given a non-empty coalition C, a game
< N;v > is a clan game with clan C if v is monotonic, each player in C has veto power,
and a union property regarding players outside the clan is satis￿ed. A clan game whose
clan consists of a single player is called a big boss game. Further, a clan game whose
all subgames are also clan games is called a total clan game. Bi-monotonic allocation
schemes (cf. Branzei, Tijs and Timmer (2001), and Voorneveld, Tijs and Grahn (2002))
are in particular appealing solution concepts for this class of games.
A more sophisticated model of cooperative games, which is a natural extension of
the traditional model, called multi-choice game, was introduced by Hsiao and Raghavan
(1993a, b) and reconsidered by Nouweland et al. (1995) in a more general setting. Multi-
choice cooperative games have become a useful tool for modeling interaction of players
in situations in which players may have di⁄erent options for cooperation, varying from
non-cooperation (participation level 0) to a maximal participation level which is greater
than or equal to 1. Examples of various situations modeled by multi-choice cooperative
games can be found in Nouweland (1993), Nouweland et al. (1995), Calvo and Santos
(2000), Peters and Zank (2005), etc. Most applications of cooperative game theory to
multi-choice situations have given rise to convex multi-choice games, motivating research
work for new solution concepts on this class of games. We mention here the constrained
egalitarian solution for convex multi-choice games (cf. Branzei et al. (2007a)) and the
notion of level-increase monotonic allocation scheme (cf. Branzei, Tijs and Zarzuelo
(2007b)). Multi-choice settings of economic situations modeled by (total) clan games,
like production economies with indivisible goods, information acquisition and holding
situations (cf. Muto et al. (1988), Potters et al. (1989), Branzei, Tijs and Timmer
(2001), Tijs, Meca and Lopez (2005)) will lead to multi-choice clan games introduced
and studied in this paper.
To ful￿ll our goal, we need some de￿nitions, notations and results on multi-choice
games, which are recalled in Section 2. The subclass of multi-choice clan games with3
a ￿xed clan is introduced and studied in Section 3. An explicit description of the core
of a multi-choice clan game is given. Furthermore, we introduce the subclass of total
clan games and deal with characterizations of such multi-choice games. In Section 4 we
de￿ne suitable compensation-sharing rules on the class of multi-choice clan games that
are additive and stable. For multi-choice total clan games we introduce the notion of
bi-monotonic allocation scheme based on one-unit level-increases of non-clan members
and full participation of clan members, and prove that some core elements of a multi-
choice total clan game are extendable to such bi-monotonic allocation schemes. Section
5 concludes.
2 Preliminaries on multi-choice games
Let N be a set of players, usually of the form f1;2;:::;ng, that consider cooperation
in a multi-choice environment, i.e. each player i 2 N has a ￿nite number of feasible
participation levels whose set we denote by Mi = f0;1;:::;mig, where mi 2 N. We
consider the product MN =
Q
i2N Mi. Each element s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) 2 MN speci￿es
a participation pro￿le for players and is referred to as a multi-choice coalition. So,
a multi-choice coalition indicates the participation level of each player. Then, m =
(m1;m2;:::;mn) is the players￿maximal participation level pro￿le that plays the role of
the "grand coalition", whereas 0 = (0;0;:::;0) plays the role of the "empty coalition".
We also use the notation M
+
i = Mi n f0g and MN
+ = MN n f0g.
A cooperative multi-choice game is a triple hN;m;vi, where v : MN ! R is the
characteristic function with v(0) = 0 that speci￿es the players￿potential worth, v(s),
when they join their e⁄orts at any activity level pro￿le s = (s1;:::;sn). For s 2 MN
we denote by (s￿i;k) the participation pro￿le where all players except player i play at
levels de￿ned by s while player i plays at level k 2 Mi. A useful particular case is
(0￿i;k), when only player i is active. We de￿ne the carrier of s by car(s) = fi 2 N j
si > 0g. For s;t 2 MN we use the notation s ￿ t i⁄ si ￿ ti for each i 2 N and de￿ne
s ^ t = (min(s1;t1);:::;min(sn;tn)) and s _ t = (max(s1;t1);:::;max(sn;tn)). We denote
the set of all multi-choice games with player set N and maximal participation pro￿le
m by MCN;m. Often, we identify a multi-choice game hN;m;vi with its characteristic
function v.
Let v 2 MCN;m. We de￿ne M := f(i;j) j i 2 N; j 2 Mig and M+ := f(i;j) j i 2
N; j 2 M
+
i g. A (level) payo⁄vector for the game v 2 MCN;m is a function x : M ! R,
where for i 2 N and j 2 M
+
i , xij denotes the payo⁄to player i corresponding to a change4
of activity level of i from j￿1 to j, and xi0 = 0 for all i 2 N. One can represent a payo⁄
vector for a game v as a
P
i2N
mi-dimensional vector whose coordinates are numbered by
the corresponding elements of M+, where the ￿rst m1 coordinates represent payo⁄s for
successive levels of player 1, the next m2 coordinates are payo⁄s for successive levels of











xij = v(m), and
is called level-increase rational if, for all i 2 N and j 2 M
+
i , xij is at least the increase
in worth that player i can obtain on his own (i.e. working alone) when he changes
his activity level from j ￿ 1 to j, that is xij ￿ v(jei) ￿ v((j ￿ 1)ei), or, equivalently,
xij ￿ v(0￿i;j) ￿ v(0￿i;j ￿ 1). A payo⁄ vector which is both e¢ cient and level-increase
rational is called an imputation. We denote by I(v) the set of imputations of v 2 MCN;m.
The core C(v) of a game v 2 MCN;m consists of all x 2 I(v) that satisfy X(s) ￿ v(s)
for all s 2 MN, i.e.
C(v) = fx 2 I(v) j X(s) ￿ v(s) for each s 2 M
Ng:
A game whose core is non-empty is called a balanced game.
Let v 2 MCN;m and let t 2 MN: We denote by MN
t the subset of MN consisting
of multi-choice coalitions s ￿ t: The subgame of v with respect to t, < N;t;vt >, is
de￿ned by vt(s) := v(s) for each s 2 MN
t :
In the sequel, we introduce di⁄erent notions of marginal contributions of players to
the grand coalition m in a game < N;m;v >. First, for each player i 2 N, we de￿ne the
marginal contribution of i to m in v by wi(m;v) = v(m) ￿ v(m￿i;0). Second, since in
a multi-choice game there might be players with more than two participation levels, it
makes sense to consider also marginal contributions of bundles of highest levels of such
players to the grand coalition m. For each i 2 N and j 2 f1;:::;mi ￿ 1g, we de￿ne
the marginal contribution wij+(m;v) of player i￿ s levels which are higher than j to the
grand coalition m in the game v by wij+(m;v) = v(m)￿v(m￿i;j); wi0+(m;v) = wi(m;v):
Finally, we introduce for each player i 2 N the notion of marginal contribution of each
of his levels to the intermediate multi-choice coalition generated by that level given that
all the other players participate at their maximal levels. For each i 2 N and j 2 M
+
i
the marginal contribution of i to the coalition (m￿i;j) is de￿ned by
wij(m;v) = v(m￿i;j) ￿ v(m￿i;j ￿ 1):
We notice that, for each i 2 N the marginal contribution wi(m;v) of player i to
m in v; is equal to the sum of all marginal contributions wij(m;v) of individual levels5
j 2 M
+





3 Characterizations of total multi-choice clan games
In this section we introduce a new class of multi-choice games, which we call multi-
choice clan games. As in the traditional model of clan games (cf. Potters et al. (1989)),
the set of players consists of two disjoint groups, a ￿xed (powerful) clan with "yes-or-
no" choices and a group of (non-powerful) non-clan members, but in the multi-choice
clan game non-clan members may have more options for cooperation. Speci￿cally, each
non-clan member can participate at any level in a given ￿nite set, whereas each clan
member can be either active or abstain from cooperation. However, the active status
(i.e. participation level 1) for all clan members is a necessary condition for generating a
positive reward for any coalition containing the clan and at least one non-clan member.
Let N = (NnC;C) be the set of players, where C stands for the clan and NnC for
the group of non-clan members. For further use, we denote by MN;C the set of multi-
choice coalitions with player set N and ￿xed clan C: For each s 2 MN;C we denote its
restrictions to NnC and C, by sNnC and sC, respectively. Note that, in a multi-choice
clan game, the maximal participation pro￿le is of the form m = (mNnC;1C):
We also denote by MN;1C the set of multi-choice coalitions s 2 MN;C with sC =
1C; that is coalitions in which all clan members fully participate. We also use the
notation M
N;1C
+ = MN;1Cnf0g: Multi-choice clan games are de￿ned here by using the
veto power of clan members, the monotonicity property of the characteristic function
and a (level) union property regarding non-clan members￿participation in multi-choice
coalitions containing at least all clan members at participation level 1. Formally, a
game < N;(mNnC;1C);v > is a multi-choice clan game if the characteristic function
v : MN;C ! R satis￿es
(i) Clan property: v(s) = 0 if sC 6= 1C;
(ii) Monotonicity property: v(s) ￿ v(t) for all s;t 2 MN;C with s ￿ t;
(iii) (Level) Union property: For each s 2 MN;1C





where for each i 2 NnC; wis+
i (m;v) denotes the marginal contribution of the bundle
of those levels of player i which are higher than the participation level of i in s:6
Remark 3.1 The (level) union property is a natural extension for multi-choice
games of the union property for traditional cooperative games. Note that the right side
of (3.1) consists of two types of level-based contributions: full marginal contributions
of those non-clan members with participation level 0 in s, and partial marginal contri-
butions for all non-clan members i 2 car(sNnC); corresponding to the bundle of levels




















In the sequel, we simply use v instead of < N;(mNnC;1C);v > : For further use, we
denote by MC
N;m
C the set of multi-choice games with a ￿xed non-empty and ￿nite set of
players N, ￿xed non-empty clan C; and maximal participation pro￿le m: We notice that
MC
N;m
C is a convex cone in MCN;m, that is for all v;w 2 MC
N;m
C and for all p;q 2 R+,
pv + qw 2 MC
N;m
C ; where R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
The next theorem gives an explicit description of the core of a multi-choice clan
game.
Theorem 3.1 Let v 2 MC
N;m
C . Then
C(v) = fx : M ! R+jX(m) = v(m);
mi X
k=j
xik ￿ v(m)￿v(m￿i;j￿1);8i 2 NnC; j 2 M
+
i g:
Proof. We denote by B(v) the set in the right-hand side of the above equality. We prove
￿rst that C(v) ￿ B(v): Let v 2 MC
N;m
C and let x 2 C(v): Note that non-negativity of x
follows from the clan property and the monotonicity property; so, xij ￿ 0 for all i 2 N
and j 2 M
+
i : Clearly, the e¢ ciency condition holds true. To prove the upper boundness
of the accumulated payo⁄s for each bundle of highest levels of each non-clan member,
we note ￿rst that the payo⁄ of each multi-choice coalition ~ s = (m￿i;j ￿ 1) 2 MN;1C;
i 2 NnC; j 2 f1;:::;mig, can be expressed as
X(~ s) = X(m) ￿
mi X
k=j




where the second equality follows from the e¢ ciency of x:7







xik ￿ v(m) ￿ v(m￿i;j ￿ 1): Hence, x 2 B(v):
Now, we prove the converse inclusion. Let x 2 B(v). The level-increase rationality
of x follows from the clan property, since xij ￿ 0 = v(0￿i;j)￿v(0￿i;j ￿1) for all i 2 N
and j 2 M
+
i : We only need to prove that X(s) ￿ v(s) for each s 2 MN;C.





xij ￿ 0 = v(s):
We focus now on stability conditions for multi-choice coalitions s 2 MN;C with
sC = 1C:
By the (level) union property, we obtain


























i (m;v) = v(m)￿v(m￿i;si) ￿
mi P
k=si+1
xik; for each i 2 NnC; since x 2 B(v).




xik ￿ 0; for each i 2 NnC: Hence, X(s) ￿ v(s)
for each s 2 MN;1C: ￿
Corollary 3.1 Let v 2 MC
N;m
C and let t 2 MN;1C: If the subgame vt is a clan game,
then its core is described by
C(vt) = fx : M
t ! R+jX(t) = v(t);
ti X
k=j




i = f1;:::;tig and Mt = f(i;j)ji 2 car(t); j 2 Mt
ig:
Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Theorem 3.1, by taking into account that
t = (tNnC;1C) is the "grand coalition" in the subgame vt: ￿8
Remark 3.2 The de￿nition of the set B(v) contains
P
i2NnC
mi inequalities which are
the multi-choice version of the conditions xi ￿ Mi(N;v) = v(N) ￿ v(Nnfig); i 2 NnC,
for traditional clan games.
Remark 3.3 The monotonicity property and the clan property imply together
the non-negativity of the characteristic function, i.e. v(s) ￿ 0 for each s 2 MN;C,
as well as the non-negativity of all types of marginal contributions de￿ned in Section
2. In particular, wi(m;v) ￿ 0 for each i 2 NnC, and it holds true wij(m;v) ￿ 0;
wij+(m;v) ￿ 0; for each i 2 NnC and for each j 2 M
+
i : Note that the bundle of
conditions wij+(m;v) ￿ 0, j 2 M
+
i , for each i 2 NnC, is the multi-choice version of the
condition Mi(N;v) ￿ 0 for traditional clan games.
Remark 3.4 Let v 2 MC
N;m
C . For each s 2 MN;C it holds
















Now, we use the (level) union property together with the non-negativity of wis+
i (m;v)
for each i 2 car(sNnC) (see Remark 3.3). ￿
Multi-choice clan games for which the clan consists of one player are called multi-
choice big boss games; we notice that in case mNnC = 1NnC these games are big boss
games in the terminology of Branzei, Tijs and Timmer (2001). The model of a multi-
choice clan game where the clan consists of at least two members is an extension of the
model of a clan game (cf. Voorneveld, Tijs and Grahn (2002)).
In the rest of this paper, we focus on total clan games with multi-choice coalitions.
A game v 2 MC
N;m
C is a multi-choice total clan game with clan C if all its subgames vt,
t 2 MN;1C, are clan games with clan C: We denote the set of all multi-choice total clan





The next theorem yields a characterization of multi-choice total clan games.
Theorem 3.2 Let < N;m;v > be a multi-choice game and let C 2 2Nnf;g with
mC = 1C: The following assertions are equivalent:9
(i) < N;m;v > is a total clan game with clan C;
(ii) < N;m;v > is monotonic, each player i 2 C is a veto player, and for all s;t 2
MN;1C with s ￿ t





(iii) < N;m;v > is monotonic, each player i 2 C is a veto player, and for each
i 2 car(sNnC) and for all s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t and si = ti :
v(t) ￿ v(t ￿ e
i) ￿ v(s) ￿ v(s ￿ e
i): (3.3)
Proof. (i)$(ii): Relation (3.2) simply writes out the (level) union property of
multi-choice subgames. In the sequel, we refer to relation (3.2) as the total (level) union
property of v:
(ii)!(iii): It su¢ ces to prove that (3.2) implies (3.3). We note that inequality (3.3)
expresses a total concavity property of v which re￿ ects the fact that the same one-unit
level decrease of a non-clan member in coalitions containing at least all clan members at
participation level 1, could be more bene￿cial in smaller such coalitions than in larger
ones. Let s 2 MN;1C and let i 2 car(sNnC): Consider the coalition s+ek obtained from
s when one of the other non-clan members, namely k, increases his participation with
one unit. We prove ￿rst
wisi(s;v) ￿ wisi(s + e
k;v): (3.4)
wisi(s;v) + wk;sk+1(s + e
k;v) = (v(s) ￿ v(s￿i;si ￿ 1)) + (3:5)
+(v(s + e
k) ￿ v(s￿k;sk))
= v(s + e
k) ￿ v(s￿i;si ￿ 1):
The total union property (with s + ek in the role of t and (s￿i;si ￿ 1) in the role of s)
yields
v(s + e
k) ￿ v(s￿i;si ￿ 1) ￿ wisi(s + e
k;v) + wk;sk+1(s + e
k;v): (3.6)
From (3.5) and (3.6) we conclude that (3.4) holds true. Denote by fi1;:::;iqg the set
of levels which are involved in t but not in s: Repeated application of (3.4) yields
wisi(s;v) ￿ wisi(s + e
i1;v) ￿ ::: ￿ wisi(s + (e
i1 + ::: + e
iq)) = wisi(t;v):10
Hence, the total concavity property (3.3) holds true.
(iii)!(ii): We simply prove that (3.3) implies (3:2). Let s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t:
Denote by fi1;:::;iqg the set of levels which are involved in t but not in s:
Then


















where the inequality follows from the total concavity property (cf. (3:6)). Hence, the
total union property (3.2) holds true. ￿
Remark 3.5 Let v 2 TCM
N;m
C and let s;t 2 MN;1C such that s ￿ t: Then, for
each i 2 car(sNnC) such that si = ti; it holds
wi(t;v) ￿ wi(s;v): (3.7)
Proof. Let s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t, and let i 2 car(sNnC) such that si = ti: Repeated
application of the total concavity property (relation (3.3)), yields
v(t￿i;si) ￿ v(t￿i;si ￿ 1) ￿ v(s￿i;si) ￿ v(s￿i;si ￿ 1);
. . .
v(t￿i;1) ￿ v(t￿i;0) ￿ v(s￿i;1) ￿ v(s￿i;0):
By summing these inequalities, we obtain v(t)￿v(t￿i;0) ￿ v(s)￿v(s￿i;0): Hence, (3.7)
holds. ￿
4 Bi-monotonic allocation schemes for multi-choice
clan games
Inspired by Sprumont (1990) (see also Hokari (2000)), who introduced and studied the
interesting notion of population monotonic scheme (pmas) for traditional cooperative
games, Branzei, Tijs and Zarzuelo (2007b) introduced for multi-choice games the notion
of level-increase monotonic allocation scheme (limas) and proved that convexity is a
su¢ cient condition for the existence of a limas. It turned out that for convex multi-choice
games each element of the Weber set (cf. Nouweland et al. (1995)) is extendable to a
limas. Also inspired by Sprumont (1990), Branzei, Tijs and Timmer (2001) introduced11
the notion of bi-monotonic allocation scheme for a total big boss game, and Voorneveld,
Tijs and Grahn (2002) extended this notion for total clan games.
Recall that a bi-mas for a traditional total clan game < N;v > with ￿xed clan
C 6= ; is an allocation scheme a = [aiS]i2S;S￿C such that
(i) stability condition: (aiS)i2S 2 C(vS) for each S 2 2N with S ￿ C;
(ii) bi-monotonicity condition: For all S;T 2 2N with S;T ￿ C; S ￿ T we have:
￿ aiS ￿ aiT, for each i 2 S \ C, and
￿ aiS ￿ aiT, for each i 2 SnC:
Note that in coalitions containing all clan members each clan member is better o⁄
in larger coalitions than in smaller ones, whereas each non-clan member is worse o⁄
when more other non-clan members join him and the clan members.
Since multi-choice total clan games are natural extensions of traditional total clan
games, we introduce here the notion of bi-(level-increase) monotonic allocation scheme
(bi-limas) for multi-choice total clan games.
De￿nition 4.1 Let v 2 TMC
N;m





i = f1;:::;tig, is called a bi-(level-increase) monotonic allocation scheme (bi-limas)
if
(i) stability condition: at 2 C(vt) for all t 2 MN;1C; and




i1, for each i 2 C;
￿ as
ij ￿ at
ij, for each i 2 car(sNnC) and each j 2 f1;:::;sig:
Note that such a bi-limas is a defective jM
N;1C
+ j ￿ jM+j-matrix, whose rows corre-
spond to multi-choice coalitions where all clan members are active, and whose columns
correspond to elements in M+ arranged according with the natural ordering for play-
ers, and for successive levels within each player. In each row t there is a core element
of the multi-choice subgame vt, with "￿" for all components xij, with i 2 NnC and
j 2 fti + 1;:::;mig: The (one-unit level-increase) monotonicity condition implies that,12
if the scheme is used as regulator for the (level) payo⁄ distributions, clan members are
paid more in larger coalitions with all clan members active than in smaller ones, whereas
each non-clan member is weakly worst o⁄ in larger coalitions with all clan members ac-
tive than in smaller such coalitions.
We study this kind of bi-monotonic allocation schemes by means of suitably de￿ned
compensation-sharing rules on the class of multi-choice (total) clan games.
De￿nition 4.2 Let NnC = f1;:::;qg; C = fq + 1;:::;ng; ￿ 2 [0;1]q and ￿ 2





zi = 1g: The compensation-sharing rule based
on ￿ and ￿,  
￿;￿ : MC
N;m





> > > <
> > > :
￿i(v(m) ￿ v(m￿i;0)) ; i 2 NnC; j = 1;






￿j(v(m) ￿ v(m￿j;0))] ; i 2 C; j = 1
(4.1)
for each i 2 N and j 2 M
+
i :
The i-th coordinate of the compensation vector ￿ indicates that level 1 of non-clan
member i gets as payo⁄, in view of its decisive role for multi-choice cooperation, the
part ￿iwi(m;v) of the marginal contribution of this player to the grand coalition m.
Then, the remainder, v(m) ￿
P
j2NnC
￿jwj(m;v), is distributed over the clan members.





Theorem 4.1 Let MC
N;m
C be the cone of multi-choice clan games with clan C:
Then,
(i)  
￿;￿ is additive, for each ￿ 2 [0;1]NnC and each ￿ 2 ￿(C); and
(ii)  
￿;￿ is stable, that is  




(i) Let v 2 [0;1]NnC and ￿ 2 ￿(C): For all v;w 2 MC
N;m
C and all p;q 2 R+, where
R+ stands for the set of non-negative real numbers, it holds
 
￿;￿(pv + qw) = p 
￿;￿(v) + q 
￿;￿(w):
Hence,  
￿;￿ is additive on the cone of multi-choice clan games.13
(ii) Let v 2 MC
N;m
C . From Theorem 3.1 and
P
i2C
￿i = 1 we obtain that  
￿;￿(v) 2 C(v):
￿
In Theorem 4.2 we prove that compensation-sharing rules de￿ned by (4.1) play a
key role for the existence of bi-limas for a subclass of multi-choice total clan games. But,
￿rst we need to establish some useful results.
Lemma 4.1 Let v 2 TMC
N;m
C and s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t. Then,




Proof. Note that s ￿ t implies car(sNnC) ￿ car(tNnC): We denote car(tNnC) ￿

























where the last inequality holds true because, by monotonicity of v, v(t) ￿ v(t￿i;si) ￿ 0
for each i 2 car(sNnC):
Lemma 4.2 Let v 2 TMC
N;m
C and s;t 2 MN;1C such that s ￿ t: Then




Proof. First, by non-negativity of ￿i and wi(t;v); and since ￿i ￿ 1, for each i 2 NnC








Second, by Lemma 4.1 we have





v(t) ￿ v(s) ￿
X
i2car((t￿s)NnC)





It turns out that for a subclass of multi-choice total-clan games compensation-
sharing rules  
￿;￿ with ￿ 2 [0;1]NnC and ￿ 2 ￿(C) generate bi-(level-increase) monotonic
allocation schemes.
Theorem 4.2 Let v 2 TMC
N;m
C be such that, for each s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t
and each i 2 car(sNnC);
v(t) ￿ v(t￿i;0) ￿ v(s) ￿ v(s￿i;0): (4.2)
Then, for each ￿ 2 [0;1]NnC and ￿ 2 ￿(C) the compensation-sharing rule  
￿;￿, de￿ned







Proof. Let ￿ 2 [0;1]NnC and ￿ 2 ￿(C). For each t 2 MN;1C, in the subgame vt, the ￿-
based compensation (regardless of ￿) for each non-clan member i 2 car(tNnC); ￿iwi(t;v),
is fully assigned as payo⁄ to level 1 of that player. So, the ￿-based compensation for
each other level of each non-clan member i 2 car(tNnC) is simply equal to 0. The
amount left for the clan, v(t)￿
P
j2car(tNnC)
￿jwj(t;v), is shared based on ￿: For each clan








Since vt is a clan game, by Theorem 4.1(ii) and Corollary 3.1, we have  
￿;￿(vt) 2
C(vt):
Now, we focus on the bi-monotonicity property. Let s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t:
First, we prove that, for each player i 2 car(sNnC) and for each level j 2 f1;:::;sig
the compensation  
￿;￿





ik (vs) = 0 =  
￿;￿
ik (vt) for k 2 f2;:::;sig: Further, by (4.2) and non-negativity of ￿i,
we obtain  
￿;￿
i1 (vs) = ￿iwi(s;v) ￿ ￿iwi(t;v) =  
￿;￿
i1 (vs); for each i 2 car(sNnC):
In the sequel, we cope with the monotonicity condition regarding shares of clan
members. Denote by R￿(vt) the ￿-based remainder for the clan members in the "grand
coalition" (tNnC;1C) of the multi-choice clan game vt: We prove ￿rst that, for each
s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t;
R￿(vt) ￿ R￿(vs): (4.3)15
R￿(vt) ￿ R￿(vs) = (v(t) ￿
X
i2car(tNnC)















where the ￿rst inequality follows from (4.2) and the non-negativity of ￿i, and the last
inequality follows from Lemma 4.2.
Hence, relation (4.3) holds true. Now, from the non-negativity of ￿i and (4.3) we
obtain  
￿;￿
i1 (vt) ￿  
￿;￿
i1 (vs); for each i 2 C: ￿
Example 4.1 Consider the multi-choice total clan game with NnC = f1;2g; C =
f3;4g and m = (2;2;1;1) where v(s;0) = v(0;s) = 2; for s 2 f1;2g; and v(s;t) = 3; for
all s;t > 0: We note that relation (4:2) holds true. Theorem 4:2 guarantees the existence
of a bi-limas via compensation-sharing rules  
￿;￿(v) with ￿ 2 [0;1]2 and ￿ 2 ￿(C).
For arbitrary multi-choice total clan games bi-limas does not necessarily exist, even
if we consider a weaker version of bi-limas where the (level) monotonicity condition
regarding the non-clan members is de￿ned by:
For all s;t 2 MN;1C with s ￿ t, we have as
ij ￿ at
ij for each i 2 car(sNnC) such that
si = ti and each j 2 f1;:::;sig:
Then, by Remark 3.5, the (level) monotonicity condition for non-clan members as
de￿ned above holds true. However, the (level) monotonicity condition for clan members
does not necessarily hold, because the remainder for the clan in larger subgames vt might
be less than the remainder for the clan in smaller subgames vs: We illustrate this issue
in the following example.
Example 4.2 Consider the multi-choice total clan game with NnC = f1;2g; C =
f3;4g and m = (2;2;1;1) where v(1;0) = v(0;1) = 2;v(2;0) = v(0;2) = 3;v(1;1) =
4;v(1;2) = v(2;1) = 5, and v(2;2) = 6:
Note that this game does not belong to the subclass of multi-choice total clan
games considered in Theorem 4.2 because, for s = (1;0) and t = (2;0), we should have
v(2;0)￿v(0;0) ￿ v(1;0)￿v(0;0); however 3 > 2: Hence, condition (4.2) does not hold.
The scheme with ￿1 = 1
2;￿2 = 1
3;￿3 = 1
3; and ￿4 = 2
3 does not satisfy the monotonic-




3 < 1 = a
(0;2)
21 (vt), consequently, it is not a bi-limas.16
Let v 2 TMC
N;m
C : A (level) payo⁄ vector b 2 C(v) is bi-limas extendable if there
exists a bi-limas [at
ij]t2MN;1C
j2N;j2Mt
i such that bij = am
ij; for each i 2 N and j 2 M
+
i :
Theorem 4.3 Let v 2 TMC
N;m
C be such that inequality (4.2) holds, for all s;t 2
MN;1C such that s ￿ t and for each i 2 car(sNnC): Then, there exist (level) payo⁄
vectors b 2 C(v) which are extendable to a bi-limas.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 each (level) payo⁄ vector b 2 C(v) is of the form
bij =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿imi(v(m) ￿ v(m￿i;mi ￿ 1)); i 2 NnC; j = mi;
￿ij(v(m￿i;j) ￿ v(m￿i;j ￿ 1)) ￿ ￿i;j+1(v(m￿i;j + 1) ￿ v(m￿i;j));






￿i1(v(m) ￿ v(m￿i;0))]; i 2 C; j = 1:
where ￿ij 2 [0;1]; for each i 2 NnC and j 2 M
+
i , and ￿ 2 ￿(C), i.e. ￿i ￿ 0; for each




Consider the particular matrix ￿ = (￿ij)i2NnC;j2M+
i with ￿ij = 0; for each i 2 NnC
and each j 2 M
+
i nf1g: Denote (￿i1)i2NnC by ~ ￿. Consider a core element ~ b 2 C(v)
corresponding to ~ ￿ and ￿: Note that ~ b =  
￿;￿(v), where  
￿;￿(v) is de￿ned by (4.1).






> > > <
> > > :
￿i1(v(s) ￿ v(s￿i;0)) ; i 2 car(sNnC); j = 1;




￿k1(v(s) ￿ v(s￿k;0))] ; i 2 C; j = 1:
(4.6)




is a bi-limas. Now, note that ~ bij = am
ij for each
i 2 NnC and each j 2 M
+
i : Hence, ~ b is bi-limas extendable. ￿
Clearly, in case mNnC = 1NnC a bi-limas coincides with a bi-mas; the subclass of
multi-choice total clan games considered in Theorem 4.2 coincides with the class of
traditional total clan games; and Theorem 4.3 says (as Theorem 3 in Voorneveld, Tijs
and Grahn, 2002) that each core element of such game is extendable to a bi-mas.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper the class of multi-choice total clan games is introduced and characterized.
An explicit description of the core of a multi-choice clan game plays a key role in de￿ning17
suitable compensation-sharing rules on this class of games. The notion of bi-(level-
increase) monotonic allocation scheme (bi-limas) is introduced, and it is shown that for
a subclass of multi-choice total clan games particular allocations in the core of each
game in that class are extendable to such bi-monotonic allocation schemes. This is the
multi-choice version of the extendability of each core element of a traditional total clan
game to a bi-mas (cf. Voorneveld, Tijs and Grahn (2002)) and the extendability of each
core element of a fuzzy total clan game of a bi-pamas (cf. Tijs et al. (2004)).
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